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CLEARLY UNCONVINCING:   
HOW HEIGHTENED EVIDENTIARY 
STANDARDS IN JUDICIAL BYPASS 
HEARINGS CREATE AN UNDUE BURDEN 
UNDER WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH 
BY HALEY HAWKINS* 
 Currently, thirty-seven states have parental involvement laws that require a 
minor seeking to access abortion care to consult or obtain consent from a parent 
before undergoing the procedure.  In these states, a minor’s only hope for getting 
around this obstacle is judicial bypass—a proceeding in which a minor must 
convince a judge that she should be able to obtain an abortion without parental 
involvement, based on two Supreme Court-articulated factors.  Many of these 
states impose heightened evidentiary standards—namely, the “clear and convincing 
evidence” standard—in these proceedings where the minor bears the burden of proof. 
 This Comment argues that imposing heightened evidentiary standards in 
judicial bypass proceedings creates an undue burden on a minor’s right to 
abortion under the strengthened standard set out in Whole Woman’s Health 
v. Hellerstedt.  Thus, the imposition of these heightened evidentiary standards 
in this context is unconstitutional. 
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Kiera was sure that if she told her mom, who volunteered for an anti-
abortion group, that she wanted to end her pregnancy, she’d be out 
of the house for good.  But when Kiera confided in a school 
counselor, she learned about another option:  [s]he could ask a 
judge for permission to have an abortion.  Her panic melted away.  
“I thought, ‘This will save me,’” she recalls.  She started socking away 
every dollar she could get her hands on—lunch money, tips from 
her waitressing job.  And she started calling courthouses.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has stated that “[a] child, merely on account of 
his minority, is not beyond the protection of the Constitution.”2  
However, in the United States, the individual rights of a minor are 
significantly limited, especially the minor’s ability to make medical 
decisions.3  This limitation is grounded in the general legal consensus 
that the right of parents to choose how to raise their children prevails 
in situations where the wishes of the minor and the parent are in 
conflict.4  While courts and legislatures have established certain 
exceptions to this general rule,5 a minor’s right to consent to medical 
                                               
 1. Molly Redden, This is How Judges Humiliate Teens Who Want Abortions, MOTHER 
JONES (Sept./Oct. 2014), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/10/teen-
abortion-judicial-bypass-parental-notification. 
 2. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979) (explaining that, although children 
are not exempt from constitutional protections, the law does operate differently for 
minors seeking to invoke such protections). 
 3. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Rosato, The Ultimate Test of Autonomy:  Should Minors Have a 
Right to Make Decisions Regarding Life-Sustaining Treatment?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 17 
(1996) (highlighting the general common law rule that minors have no medical 
decision making power, even with regard to life-sustaining treatment). 
 4. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (carving out a “liberty 
[interest] of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children 
under their control”); see also J. SHOSHANNA EHRLICH, WHO DECIDES?  THE ABORTION 
RIGHTS OF TEENS 40 (2006) (noting that the Supreme Court has most recently “sh[ied] 
away from the ‘Individualistic Model’ when faced with cases involving actual or 
potential disputes between parents and children” and, instead, defers to the “parental 
control over the ‘upbringing and education’ of their children”); Lawrence Schlam & 
Joseph P. Wood, Informed Consent to the Medical Treatment of Minors:  Law and Practice, 10 
HEALTH MATRIX 141, 149 (2000) (noting that the emphasis on parents’ rights in 
medical decision making situations for minors rests on the presumption that parents 
will act in the best interest of the child because of “natural bonds of affection”). 
 5. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 681–82 (1977) (striking 
down a state statute that prohibited minors under sixteen-years-old from obtaining 
contraception); see also Minors’ Access to Contraceptive Services, GUTTMACHER INST. (June 
1, 2018), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/minors-access-contraceptive- 
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procedures remains extremely limited, including the right to consent 
to have an abortion.6 
In 1973, the Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade7 that women have a 
fundamental right to abortion based on the substantive due process 
right to privacy.8  However, since this landmark ruling, a limiting 
framework has emerged that governs when minors may exercise this 
right.  Seeking to protect parental rights and provide a check on 
minors’ decision making, the majority of states have enacted parental 
involvement laws.9  Laws of this type require parental consent, parental 
notification, or both, before the minor obtains an abortion.10  States 
are permitted to pass these laws, so long as the statute provides a 
judicial bypass option by which a minor may obtain a waiver of parental 
consent or notification by court order.11  In Bellotti v. Baird,12 the Court 
enumerated two situations in which a waiver of parental consent or 
notification may be granted:  (1) when the minor is mature enough to 
make the decision independently to have an abortion, or (2) when an 
abortion is in the minor’s best interest, even though she cannot make 
the decision independently.13 
                                               
services (stating that “21 states and the District of Columbia explicitly allow all minors 
to consent to contraceptive services”). 
 6. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992) (ruling 
that a minor’s right to abortion may be subject to parental consent). 
 7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 8. Id. at 153 (concluding that regardless of whether the right of privacy is rooted 
in the personal liberty protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, as the Court 
believed, or the reserved rights of the Ninth Amendment, as the district court ruled, 
the Constitution safeguards a woman’s freedom to terminate her pregnancy). 
 9. See Abortion and Parental Involvement Laws:  A Threat to Young Women’s Health and 
Safety, ADVOCATES FOR YOUTH (Dec. 2013), http://www.advocatesforyouth.org/ 
storage/advfy/documents/abortion%20and%20parental%20involvement%20laws.pdf. 
 10. See id. (explaining that parental involvement laws come in two forms:  “those 
that require parental notification and those that require parental consent before a 
young person seeks abortion services,” and further noting that twenty-one states 
require parental consent only, thirteen states require parental notification only, and 
five states require both consent and notification); see also State Laws and Policies:  
Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions, GUTTMACHER INST. (June 1, 2018), https://w
ww.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/parental-involvement-minors-abortions 
(highlighting that thirty-four states allow minors to obtain an abortion without parental 
consent, notification, or alternative judicial waiver in the case of a medical emergency, 
and fifteen states allow a minor to do so in cases of abuse, assault, incest, or neglect). 
 11. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643–44 (1979). 
 12. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
 13. Id. at 643–44. 
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In these judicial bypass proceedings, the minor bears the burden of 
proof for establishing her “maturity” or “best interests.”14  However, the 
Court in Bellotti did not specify the evidentiary standard required for a 
minor to prove she is mature enough to obtain an abortion or that it 
is in her best interests; instead, the Court left this determination up to 
the state legislatures.15  This has resulted in varying evidentiary 
requirements and appellate standards of review across the country.16  
For example, fifteen of the thirty-seven states with parental 
involvement laws require “clear and convincing evidence” to prove that 
a minor is mature enough to obtain an abortion or that it is in her best 
interests.17  In light of the widespread use of this heightened evidentiary 
standard and the substantial obstacle it places in the way of minors, this 
Comment will argue that heightened evidentiary standards in judicial 
bypass hearings place an undue burden on minors seeking abortion 
care without parental involvement based on the strengthened undue 
burden test articulated in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,18 and 
despite the Court’s ruling in Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive 
                                               
 14. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 515–16 (1990) (citing 
Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634) (“A State does not have to bear the burden of proof on the 
issues of maturity or best interests.  The principal opinion in Bellotti indicates that a 
State may require the minor to prove these facts in a bypass procedure.”). 
 15. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643–44 (using the terms “best interests” and “maturity” 
without providing definitions). 
 16. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw. v. Alaska, 375 P.3d 1122, 1149, 
1154 (Alaska 2016) (overturning a parental involvement statute that required clear 
and convincing evidence based, in part, on the fact that “in close cases, a higher 
standard of proof will place the risk of erroneous factfinding on the child” (quoting 
Evans v. McTaggart, 88 P.3d 1078, 1095 (Alaska 2004) (Fabe, C.J., dissenting))); In re 
Petition of Anonymous 1, 558 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Neb. 1997) (deciding in favor of the 
clear and convincing evidence standard in judicial bypass proceedings based on the 
“magnitude of the decision at issue, the fact that the proceedings are ex parte in 
nature, and [the] recogni[tion] that any evidence will usually satisfy the 
preponderance of the evidence standard”).  While an expedited appeals process is 
required for judicial bypass hearings where a waiver has been denied, states have 
varying appellate standards of review that prevent a meaningful check on trial court 
judges’ decisions.  See Caroline A. Placey, Comment, Of Judicial Bypass Procedures, Moral 
Recusal, and Protected Political Speech:  Throwing Pregnant Minors Under the Campaign Bus, 
56 EMORY L.J. 693, 707–08 (2006) (citing examples of states with wide-ranging 
appellate standards of review for judicial bypass hearings from “de novo” to “abuse of 
discretion”); id. at 707 (“A survey of published judicial bypass appellate opinions 
reveals that varied judgments result from similar facts, even in a single state.”). 
 17. GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 10. 
 18. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
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Health.19  Furthermore, the outcome of this strengthened analysis 
negates the ruling in Akron Center for Reproductive Health with respect to 
the Court’s assertion that the clear and convincing evidence standard 
does not impose an undue burden on minors’ right to abortion. 
Part I will provide an overview of minors’ abortion rights and the 
evolution of the judicial bypass process.  It will also look at the purpose 
and function of the clear and convincing evidence standard in general 
and as applied to judicial bypass proceedings.  Then, it will examine 
the Court’s holding in Akron Center for Reproductive Health and outline 
the structure of the Whole Woman’s Health analysis.20  Part II will apply 
the strengthened undue burden test set out in Whole Woman’s Health to 
the Court’s analysis of the clear and convincing evidence standard 
permitted under Akron Center for Reproductive Health and argue that 
these heightened evidentiary standards create an undue burden and 
are therefore unconstitutional.21  Finally, this Comment will conclude 
that the use of the clear and convincing evidence standard in judicial 
bypass proceedings creates an undue burden under the strengthened 
undue burden test in Whole Woman’s Health, and will recommend a 
model parental involvement statute that comports with due process 
standards enumerated in the Whole Woman’s Health ruling.22 
I.    BACKGROUND 
This Section will provide an overview of the information needed to 
determine the constitutionality of the imposition of the clear and 
convincing evidence standard within judicial bypass proceedings.  It 
will first explain how judicial bypass is situated within abortion 
jurisprudence overall and the governing standards of judicial bypass.23  
Next, it will outline the purpose and function of the clear and 
convincing evidence standard, both generally and in the context of 
judicial bypass.24  Then, the Section will provide an overview of the 
Court’s decision in Akron Center for Reproductive Health, and its approval 
of the clear and convincing evidence standard in judicial bypass 
                                               
 19. 497 U.S. 502 (1990). 
 20. See infra Part I. 
 21. See infra Part II. 
 22. See infra Conclusion. 
 23. See infra Section I.A. 
 24. See infra Section I.B. 
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proceedings.25  Last, it will explain the strengthened undue burden 
standard articulated in Whole Woman’s Health.26 
A.   Judicial Bypass within the Evolution of Abortion Jurisprudence 
In Roe, the Supreme Court ruled that abortion is a fundamental right 
encompassed in the right to privacy.27  In addition to situating the right 
to abortion within substantive due process, the Court in Roe also set up 
a trimester framework, which provided that a woman’s right to 
abortion without regulation decreased each trimester of the 
pregnancy.28  Specifically, during the first trimester, the choice of 
whether to abort was to be left to the woman and her doctor;29 during 
the second trimester, states were permitted to impose abortion 
regulations to protect women’s health;30 and during the third 
trimester, states were permitted to restrict or prohibit abortion, except 
where an abortion would be necessary to preserve the life or health of 
the woman.31  However, despite carefully crafting this approach to 
protect the abortion right—which was later replaced by the fetal 
viability standard and undue burden test32—the Court in Roe left open 
the question of how the abortion right was to be applied to minors, other 
than the general assertion that the right to abortion is not absolute.33 
Three years later, the Court, in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri 
v. Danforth,34 ruled that a state could not authorize a blanket parental 
veto over a minor’s right to abortion.35  In doing so, the Court addressed 
one of the primary justifications asserted in favor of parental involvement 
laws and regulations pertaining to such laws—the preservation of parental 
rights and family cohesion—by stating: 
                                               
 25. See infra Section I.C. 
 26. See infra Section I.D. 
 27. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 28. See id. at 164–65. 
 29. Id. at 163 (“[P]rior to this ‘compelling’ point, the attending physician, in 
consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the state, that 
in his medical judgment, the patient’s pregnancy should be terminated.”). 
 30. Id. at 164. 
 31. Id. at 164–65. 
 32. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see infra note 47 
and accompanying text. 
 33. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (specifying that the right to abortion “is not absolute 
and subject to some limitations”). 
 34. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
 35. Id. at 74. 
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It is difficult . . . to conclude that providing a parent with absolute 
power to overrule a determination, made by a physician and his 
minor patient, to terminate the patient’s pregnancy will serve to 
strengthen the family unit.  Neither is it likely that such veto power 
will enhance parental authority or control where the minor and the 
nonconsenting parent are so fundamentally in conflict and the very 
existence of the pregnancy already has fractured the family 
structure.36 
This set the stage for perhaps the most important Supreme Court 
decision regarding a minor’s right to receive an abortion, which came 
three years later in Bellotti.  In that case, the Court addressed the 
question of the constitutionality of parental involvement statutes for 
minors seeking abortions.37  The plaintiffs consisted of a “class of 
unmarried minors in Massachusetts who [had] adequate capacity to 
give valid and informed consent [to abortion], and who [did] not wish 
to involve their parents.”38  The minors challenged the constitutionality 
of the Massachusetts parental consent statute, arguing that minors of 
“adequate capacity” are capable of informed consent with respect to 
abortion procedures.39  The Court ruled that a parental consent statute 
did not violate a minor’s right to abortion, as long as the state also 
provided a bypass process through which a minor can petition for a 
waiver of parental consent.  The minor can obtain a judicial waiver by 
showing that either she is “mature enough and well enough informed 
to make her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician, 
independently of her parents’ wishes, or . . . that even if she is not able 
to make the decision independently, the desired abortion would be in 
her best interests.”40  The “maturity” determination remains steeped in 
criticism and judicial application of the standard has varied widely.41  
                                               
 36. Id. at 75. 
 37. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979) (hearing a challenge to a state statute 
requiring parental consent for a minor to receive an abortion, enacted in light of the 
Court’s holding in Danforth). 
 38. Id. at 626 (noting that the co-plaintiffs also included the Parents Aid Society, 
Inc., William Baird, the Society’s founder, and Gerald Zupnick, M.D.). 
 39. See id. at 628 (discussing the district court’s conclusion that “a substantial 
number of females under the age of 18 are capable of forming a valid consent” 
(quoting Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847, 855 (D. Mass. 1975))). 
 40. Id. at 643–44. 
 41. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 475 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring in 
part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (asserting that “[i]t is difficult 
to conceive of any reason . . . that would justify a finding that an immature woman’s best 
interests would be served by forcing her to endure pregnancy and childbirth against her 
will”); see also HELENA SILVERSTEIN, GIRLS ON THE STAND:  HOW COURTS FAIL PREGNANT 
2018] CLEARLY UNCONVINCING 1919 
 
The Court later clarified the “best interests” consideration by opining 
that finding parental involvement is not in the minor’s best interests is 
equivalent to finding that an abortion is in the minor’s best interest 
and, thus, either articulation of the standard is permissible.42  However, 
other than the decision in Bellotti, there is little judicial guidance on 
the meaning of the “best interests” standard in this particular type of 
proceeding; rather, since the “circumstances in which [the abortion] 
issue arises will vary widely,” the “best interests” determination necessarily 
requires a case-by-case analysis.43 
The Court articulated three reasons for requiring a judicial bypass 
process with the “maturity” and “best interests” considerations:  (1) “the 
peculiar vulnerability of children”; (2) “their inability to make critical 
decisions in an informed, mature manner”; and (3) “the importance of 
the parental role in child rearing.”44  The Court first explained that 
minors’ due process rights are coextensive with those of adults, but can 
be altered to “account for children’s vulnerability and their needs for 
concern, . . . sympathy, and . . . paternal attention.”45  It then went on 
to define the states’ ability to limit minors’ decision making power with 
respect to “important, affirmative choices with potentially serious 
consequences.”46  Finally, with regard to the third prong of the 
justification for limitations on minors’ right to abortion, the Court 
relied on long-standing precedent supporting parents’ interest in 
exercising care and custody over their children, and all of the requisite 
checks on minors’ autonomy in decision making that comes along with 
this interest.47  In terms of the actual structure of the judicial bypass 
                                               
MINORS 26 (2007) (noting that the Court’s lack of guidance on the meaning of “maturity” 
and “best interests” gives judges substantial discretion in these determinations). 
 42. See Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 297–98 (1997) (per curiam). 
 43. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642–43 (contemplating that alternatives, such as marriage, adoption, 
or raising the child with family support may be “relevant to the minor’s best interests”). 
 44. Id. at 634. 
 45. Id. at 635 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 
403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971)) (using the juvenile justice system as an example of context in 
which minors retain their due process rights but are afforded extra procedural 
protections in light of their vulnerability). 
 46. Id. at 635–36 (using a First Amendment case to illustrate the point).  But see 
Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 669 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(distinguishing the denial of minors’ right to abortion from other types of temporary 
denials of minors’ rights (i.e. underage marriage), by explaining that “[g]iving birth 
to an unwanted child involves an irretrievable change in position for a minor”). 
 47. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 637–39; see also Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 
(1925) (holding that choice of children’s education was encompassed by parents’ liberty 
interest to “direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”); 
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process, the Court in Bellotti stipulated that the process must “be 
completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an 
effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained,” but did not 
specify any other procedural requirements.48 
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,49 the Court 
subsequently affirmed Bellotti by upholding a parental consent statute 
under the new “undue burden” standard.  This standard invalidates 
any statutory provision governing the right to abortion when it “has the 
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”50  In that case, 
abortion clinics and physicians challenged five different provisions of 
the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982; one of which 
“require[d] the informed consent of one of [a minor’s] parents, but 
provide[d] for a judicial bypass option.”51  Applying the new undue 
burden standard,52 the Court upheld all of the challenged provisions 
except for the spousal notification provision in the Act.53  In striking 
down a spousal notification provision while upholding the parental 
consent provision, the Court focused on the possibility of domestic 
abuse victims facing life-threatening situations if forced to notify their 
spouses, explaining that “the significant number of women who fear 
for their safety and the safety of their children are likely to be deterred 
from procuring an abortion as surely as if the Commonwealth had 
outlawed abortion in all cases.”54  Thus, the Court opined that, at least 
for this group of women, the spousal notification provision—like that 
of spousal consent—would function as an absolute veto and place an 
undue burden on a woman’s right to abortion.55  However, the Court 
                                               
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (holding a law prohibiting the instruction 
of the German language unconstitutional, in part because of the “right of parents to 
engage [teachers] so to instruct their children”).  But see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 
U.S. 158, 168 (1944) (emphasizing parents’ right to direct the upbringing of their 
children, but holding that child labor laws trumped this right, as parental rights are 
not absolute). 
 48. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 644. 
 49. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 50. See id. at 877, 899 (reaffirming the Bellotti decision by finding that no undue burden 
was created by a parental consent statute when there is a judicial bypass option available). 
 51. Id. at 844. 
 52. See id. at 879. 
 53. Id. at 879–901. 
 54. Id. at 894. 
 55. See id. at 897 (citing Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 
52, 69 (1976)) (finding spousal consent provisions unconstitutional). 
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noted that the inclusion of the judicial bypass process appropriately 
diminished the veto effect of a parental consent requirement, and thus 
explained why parental involvement laws were upheld in the decision, 
while spousal notification provisions were simultaneously struck down.56 
Though it has been asserted that the framework and reasoning used 
in Casey to strike down spousal notification laws could and should be 
logically extended to parental involvement laws,57 the Court has yet to 
do so.58  Instead, the only clear constitutional guideposts in place for 
the judicial bypass process are the vague “maturity” and “best interests” 
standards set out in Bellotti.59  This leaves states plenty of room to 
expand or restrict minors’ rights within the general framework of these 
proceedings—which results in the imposition of seemingly small 
hurdles that add up and make the process of judicial bypass extremely 
burdensome for many young women.60 
                                               
 56. See id. at 899.  But see Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 473 (1990) 
(Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting 
in part) (arguing that “a judicial bypass procedure . . . is itself unconstitutional because 
it effectively gives a judge an absolute veto over the decision of the physician and his 
patient” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 57. See generally Alexandra Rex, Note, Protecting the One Percent:  Relevant Women, 
Undue Burdens, and Unworkable Judicial Bypasses, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 85, 108–18 (2014) 
(applying the Casey spousal notification analysis to parental involvement laws). 
 58. Id. at 108 n.140 (noting that courts often uphold “Casey look-alike statutes” 
despite the questionable purposes and benefits of parental involvement laws). 
 59. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643–44 (1979); see also Lambert v. Wicklund, 
520 U.S. 292, 297–98 (1997) (per curiam) (specifying, as to the “best interests” 
standard, that “requiring a minor to show that parental notification is not in her best 
interests is equivalent to a judicial bypass procedure requiring a minor to show that 
abortion without notification is in her best interests”). 
 60. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 441–42 (internal quotation marks omitted)) (“[J]udges 
who adjudicated over 90% of [the] petitions [in question in that case] testified; none 
of them identified any positive effects of the [parental involvement] law.  The court 
experience produced fear, tension, anxiety, and shame among minors, causing some 
who were mature, or some whose best interests would have been served by an abortion, 
to forego the bypass option and either notify their parents or carry to term.”); Paul 
Danielson, Judicial Recusal and a Minor’s Right to an Abortion, 2 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 
125, 132 (2007) (noting that, in seeking to access the judicial bypass process, “a minor 
must take a number of time-consuming steps, including ‘contact[ing] the attorney, 
arrang[ing] for transportation to court, and leav[ing] school without having her 
parents learn of the situation’” (alterations in original)); Lauren Treadwell, Note, 
Informal Closing of the Bypass:  Minors’ Petitions to Bypass Parental Consent for Abortion in an 
Age of Increasing Judicial Recusals, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 869, 878 (2006) (arguing that the 
abundance of judicial recusals for judges assigned to judicial bypass hearings due to 
an inability to be impartial on an issue involving abortion triggers the application of 
the undue burden standard by presenting obstacles for the minors undergoing 
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One practical hurdle for minors going through the judicial bypass 
process is the current trend among states with parental involvement 
laws to raise the evidentiary standard for minors in judicial bypass 
hearings from the common “preponderance of the evidence” standard 
to the “clear and convincing evidence” standard.61  Currently, fifteen 
states62 require a clear and convincing evidence standard for minors 
going through the judicial bypass process.63  Furthermore, only five of 
these states also provide specific criteria governing how the judge 
evaluates “maturity” or “best interests,”64 leaving minors pursuing 
                                               
the process); Judicial Bypass Procedures:  Undue Burdens for Young People Seeking Safe 
Abortion Care, ADVOCATES FOR YOUTH (June 2015), http://www.advocatesforyouth.org/ 
storage/advfy/documents/Factsheets/judicial%20bypass%20procedures.pdf  (highli
ghting logistical obstacles to judicial bypass implemented by various states, including 
rules limiting which courts can hold the hearings, longer durations for the process, 
allowance of bias-laden judicial questioning of the minor, and provision of legal 
representation for the fetus); GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 10 (identifying waiting 
periods for minors and requirements of notarized documentation of parental consent 
as obstacles for minors seeking to obtain an abortion, even without going through the 
judicial bypass process); Redden, supra note 1 (providing anecdotal evidence of a 
Florida teen who faced cumulative obstacles in pursuing a waiver of parental consent 
through the judicial bypass process). 
 61. GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 10. 
 62. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152(C) (2014); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-
809(c)(1)(A) (2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-37.5-107(2)(a) (2003) (repealed 2018); 
FLA. STAT. § 390.01114(4)(c) (2011) (amended 2018); IDAHO CODE § 18-609A(2) 
(2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705(d) (2014); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.14(B)(4)(b) 
(2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-55(4) (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03.1(2) 
(2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-6903(2) (2011) (amended 2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2151.85(C)(1) (West 2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-740.3(A) (2013); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 34-23A-7(1) (2017); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003(i) (West 2016); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 35-6-118(v)(B) (1997). 
 63. Many states with heightened evidentiary standards for judicial bypass hearings 
also have highly deferential appellate standards of review (i.e. “clearly erroneous” or 
“abuse of discretion”) for appellate courts reviewing the decisions from these hearings.  
See Placey, supra note 16, at 732–40.  This presents even greater concern, given that a 
denial of judicial bypass under a heightened evidentiary standard will also often go 
unchecked by the appellate process.  See id. at 707 (“A survey of published judicial 
bypass appellate opinions reveals that varied judgments result from similar facts, even 
in a single state.”). 
 64. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 390.01114(4)(c) (instructing the courts to consider the 
pregnant minor’s age, intelligence, “[e]motional development and stability,” 
“[c]redibility and demeanor as a witness,” “[a]bility to accept responsibility,” “[a]bility 
to assess both the immediate and long-range consequences of the minor’s choices,” 
and “[a]bility to understand and explain the medical risks of terminating her 
pregnancy and to apply that understanding to her decision”); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
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judicial bypass in the other nine states subject not only to a heightened 
evidentiary standard, but also blind to specific pleading requirements.65  
The imposition of this heightened standard tends to be motivated by 
“a sense in these states that girls ‘have it easy’ going into a bypass 
hearing.”66  However, before engaging in an in-depth discussion on the 
permissibility of the use of this standard in judicial bypass proceedings, 
it is helpful to first gain an understanding of its general origins and its 
alleged purpose in the judicial bypass context. 
B.   Purpose and Function of the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard 
The clear and convincing evidence standard of proof is the highest 
evidentiary standard employed in civil proceedings, second only to the 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard employed in criminal proceedings.67  
In general, standards of proof function to “instruct the factfinder 
concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have 
in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of 
adjudication.”68  Within the range of standards, clear and convincing 
evidence is situated to “protect particularly important individual interests 
in various civil cases” that involve more than “mere loss of money.”69  
Though the meaning of “clear and convincing” varies by state, one can 
generally articulate the standard as “persuad[ing] the [factfinder] that 
the proposition is highly probable, or . . . produc[ing] in the mind of 
the factfinder a firm belief or conviction that the allegations in 
question are true.”70  Thus, the typical evidentiary standard is 
preponderance of the evidence, and the clear and convincing evidence 
standard tends to be employed where a party—usually a defendant in a 
proceeding initiated by the government—is at risk of having a significant 
                                               
ANN. § 36-2152(C); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-801(d)(2); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705(n); 
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003(i-1). 
 65. Compare, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 390.01114(4)(c) (listing multiple factors that courts 
must consider to determine a minor’s “maturity” and “best interests”), with MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 41-41-55(4) (listing the Bellotti “maturity” and “best interests” factors without 
any additional explanation). 
 66. Carol Sanger, Decisional Dignity:  Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings, and the Misuse 
of Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409, 432 (2009); see infra notes 75–76 and 
accompanying text (examining judicial bypass structure). 
 67. See 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 173 (2017) (examining the various evidentiary 
standards of proof). 
 68. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 69. Id. at 424 (defining intermediate evidentiary standards). 
 70. 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 173. 
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liberty interest erroneously taken away.71  This is justified by the principle 
that “[t]he individual should not be asked to share equally with society 
the risk of error when the possible injury to the individual is significantly 
greater than any possible harm to the state,” as he or she would 
presumably be required to do if the applicable standard of proof was 
preponderance of the evidence.72  For example, in Addington v. Texas,73 
the Court determined that an individual’s interest in avoiding civil 
commitment is so weighty that the government must justify commitment 
by clear and convincing evidence to comport with due process.74 
Employing the clear and convincing evidence standard in judicial 
bypass proceedings has been justified in various ways.  For instance, the 
“magnitude of the decision at issue” has been used to justify a 
heightened evidentiary standard.75  Furthermore, the state and parental 
interests in the outcome of the proceeding provide courts with further 
support for ruling in favor of the heightened evidentiary standard.76  
                                               
 71. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768, 791 (1982) (upholding the 
application of the clear and convincing evidence standard to parental termination 
proceedings, reasoning that, “at a parental rights termination proceeding, a near-
equal allocation of risk [of interest deprivation] between the parents and the State is 
constitutionally intolerable”); Addington, 441 U.S. at 425 (requiring clear and 
convincing evidence in civil commitment proceedings); Nowak v. United States, 356 
U.S. 660, 663 (1958) (requiring that the government prove the defendant’s non-
citizen status in a denaturalization proceeding by “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” 
evidence so as “not [to] leave the ‘issue in doubt’”) (citation omitted). 
 72. Addington, 441 U.S. at 427. 
 73. 441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
 74. Id. at 427. 
 75. See In re Petition of Anonymous 1, 558 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Neb. 1997) (per 
curiam) (considering the magnitude of the decision, the ex parte structure of the 
proceedings, and the relative ease of proving requirements under the preponderance 
of the evidence standard to justify the imposition of the clear and convincing evidence 
standard on minors going through the judicial bypass process). 
 76. See In re B.S., 74 P.3d 285, 289–90 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that 
application of the clear and convincing standard is permissible to prevent the bypass 
process from becoming “a mere pass-through proceeding,” “to maximize the court’s 
ability to make a reasoned decision,” and to take into account the impact of the process 
on parental decision making rights); see also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) 
(“[I]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in 
the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations that 
state can neither supply nor hinder.” (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 
(1944))).  But see Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw. v. Alaska, 375 P.3d 1122, 1164 
(Alaska 2016) (ruling that a parental involvement statute requiring a clear and 
convincing evidence standard in judicial bypass proceedings was not narrowly tailored 
to serve the state’s interests in “protecting minors from their own immaturity” and 
“aiding parents to fulfill their parental responsibilities”). 
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Thus, the judicial bypass proceeding implicates a complex web of 
rights and interests and puts the minor at the center of the process in 
a tricky position, given that the minor is “the party asserting the 
affirmative of an issue,” and thus bears the burden of proof,77 but is 
also the party attempting to protect a constitutionally-afforded, 
fundamental liberty interest.78  This structure is, therefore, unique in 
that the clear and convincing evidence standard is not imposed in this 
context to protect the defendant from government intrusion on a 
liberty interest.79  Indeed, there is no defendant, and the principal 
party with a competing interest—generally the parents—are not 
actively asserting their rights by virtue of the proceeding’s purpose and 
structure.80  This, in turn, makes the weighing of interests and 
application of the undue burden standard all the more complicated.  
Furthermore, while recent developments in the evolution of the undue 
burden standard have not specifically referenced its application to 
judicial bypass proceedings, they do provide a stronger framework for 
analyzing the impact of heightened evidentiary standards, coupled 
with the state interests espoused in the process of imposing these 
standards.  However, as of now, the ultimate rule of law is that these 
heightened standards are constitutional.81 
C.   Using a Heightened Evidentiary Standard Under  
Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health 
While heightened evidentiary standards present significant 
challenges for minors who still bear the ultimate burden of proving 
“maturity” or “best interests,”82 the Supreme Court has held that the 
                                               
 77. Anonymous 1, 558 N.W.2d at 787; see supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 78. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 90 (1976) (Stewart, 
J., concurring) (asserting that a statute’s “imposition of an absolute limitation on the 
minor’s right to obtain an abortion” renders the statute unconstitutional); see also Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (situating the right to abortion within the fundamental 
substantive due process right to privacy); supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 79. See supra note 71 and accompanying text; see also Wendy-Adele Humphrey, Two-
Stepping Around a Minor’s Constitutional Right to Abortion, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1769, 1794 
n.165 (2017) (“The Texas Family Code uses clear and convincing evidence in a number of 
other circumstances, but the burden is generally used only when the state is attempting to 
take away a constitutional right . . . .  Thus, arguably, the heightened burden should not be 
used as an additional hurdle for a young woman to exercise a constitutional right she 
already has:  the right to choose when and whether to become a parent.”). 
 80. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 81. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 82. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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use of these standards is constitutional where the hearing is conducted 
ex parte.83  In Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Slaby,84 the Sixth 
Circuit applied a procedural due process analysis and ruled that use of 
the clear and convincing evidence standard in judicial bypass 
proceedings was unconstitutional.85  Specifically, the court illuminated 
the procedural deficiencies in requiring a heightened standard of 
proof for minors, given the liberty interest at stake, by stating that: 
[i]n considering whether the standard of proof utilized in a given 
proceeding complies with due process, a court must consider three 
factors:  “the private interests affected by the proceeding; the risk of 
error created by the State’s chosen procedure; and the countervailing 
government interest supporting use of the challenged procedure.”86 
By engaging in this analysis, the court used the Mathews v. Eldridge87 
framework, where the risk of erroneous deprivation of a protected 
liberty interest is weighed against the state interest in using the 
particular procedural device.88  The court ultimately found that the 
clear and convincing evidence standard presented too great a risk of 
erroneous deprivation of the minor’s protected liberty interest in 
obtaining an abortion.89  Notably, this decision occurred before the 
undue burden standard existed, thus explaining the reliance on a 
procedural due process approach. 
However, on appeal in Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, the 
Supreme Court overturned the Sixth Circuit’s decision, relying heavily 
on the provision of a non-adversarial setting for the judicial bypass 
hearing—an ex parte hearing—as well as the assistance of counsel as 
                                               
 83. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 516 (1990) (stating 
that the state may require a clear and convincing evidence standard where the hearing 
is ex parte and finding the provision of a court-appointed guardian ad litem to be 
persuasive in favor of the permissiveness of heightened standards).  But see Elizabeth 
Susan Graybill, Note, Assisting Minors Seeking Abortions in Judicial Bypass Proceedings:  A 
Guardian Ad Litem is No Substitute for an Attorney, 55 VAND. L. REV. 581, 586 (2002) 
(noting that “it is possible that the guardian ad litem will subvert the minor’s expressed 
interest in seeking a judicial waiver of parental involvement by advocating . . . that an 
abortion is not in the minor’s best interests”). 
 84. 854 F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1988), rev’d sub nom. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502. 
 85. Slaby, 854 F.2d at 864. 
 86. Id. at 863 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982)). 
 87. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 88. See id. at 342 (finding that certain administrative procedures created too great 
a risk of erroneous deprivation in the form of social security benefits termination, 
which the Court considered to be a particularly weighty property interest because 
public benefits are life-sustaining for those who rely on them). 
 89. Slaby, 854 F.2d at 863. 
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lessening the burden placed on the minor, despite the statutory 
burden of proof still ultimately resting on her shoulders.90  Thus, the 
Court declined to follow the Sixth Circuit’s procedural due process 
analysis,91 instead relying on what it considered to be ample procedural 
safeguards—chiefly, assistance of counsel and an ex parte hearing 
structure.92  The issue of heightened evidentiary standards in judicial 
bypass hearings, however, still presents a unique intersection of 
challenges involving both substantive and procedural due process 
implications. 
D.   The Strengthened Undue Burden Standard Under  
Whole Woman’s Health 
While the Court in Casey defined an undue burden as any provision 
that “has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman seeking an abortion,”93 the Court recently gave teeth 
to this standard in Whole Woman’s Health.94  In the case, the Court 
analyzed the effects of Texas’s Targeted Regulations of Abortion 
Providers (TRAP laws)95 on women’s access to abortion in the state.  
The Court engaged in two types of analyses in unprecedented depth:  
(1) examination of extensive data regarding the effect of the laws on 
women’s actual access to clinics and abortion care, and (2) consideration 
of whether the asserted purpose of the regulations matched up with a 
demonstrated need for those measures.96 
                                               
 90. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 516 (1990). 
 91. See id. at 519–20. 
 92. See id. at 517. 
 93. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (explaining 
that a state provision is invalidated when it creates an undue burden). 
 94. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
 95. So-called “TRAP laws” encompass laws that “single out the medical practices of 
doctors who provide abortions and impose on them requirements that are different 
and more burdensome than those imposed on other medical practices.”  Targeted Regulation 
of Abortion Providers (TRAP), CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS. (Aug. 28, 2015), https://www. 
reproductiverights.org/project/targeted-regulation-of-abortion-providers-trap.  These 
regulations include certain facility standards (most notably, ambulatory surgical center 
requirements), required relationships with hospitals (for example, physicians 
performing abortions have admitting privileges at a nearby hospital), and onerous 
licensing standards.  See State Laws and Policies:  Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, 
GUTTMACHER INST. (June 1, 2018), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/ 
targeted-regulation-abortion-providers. 
 96. The Court “conclude[ed] that neither of the provisions confer[red] medical 
benefits sufficient to justify the burdens upon access that each impose[d].”  Whole 
Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered 
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In enacting the TRAP laws, Texas imposed onerous regulations on 
abortion providers, which were not required for other similarly 
situated medical providers, all supposedly in the name of protecting 
women’s health.97  These laws represent one of many regulation 
strategies across the United States put in place to chip away at abortion 
access.98  However, in analyzing the health benefits of these regulations—
or lack thereof—the Court abandoned the deference accorded to 
legislative findings in the prior case of Gonzales v. Carhart,99 noting that 
the statute at issue failed to include any legislative findings, so the 
Court was “left to infer that the legislature sought to further a 
constitutionally acceptable objective.”100  In its conclusion, the Court 
placed great emphasis on the legislature producing concrete data on 
the remedial nature of regulations if claiming they were passed for a 
women’s health-protective purpose.101 
                                               
data on clinic closures resulting from Texas’s admitting privileges requirement, id. at 
2312, and the same with respect to Texas’s surgical center requirements, id. at 2315–
16.  See Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, The Difference a Whole Woman Makes:  
Protection for the Abortion Right After Whole Woman’s Health, 126 YALE L.J.F. 149, 150 
(2016) (suggesting that Whole Woman’s Health unexpectedly broadened the protections 
for the abortion right by giving “close attention to scientific evidence about the health 
benefits of regulating abortion,” which “call[ed] into question myriad health-
justified . . . [and] fetal-protective restrictions on abortion”). 
 97. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 96, at 151. 
 98. See Olga Khazan, Planning the End of Abortion, THE ATLANTIC (July 16, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/what-pro-life-activists-really-
want/398297 (discussing how state legislators partner with pro-life groups to pass 
potentially unconstitutional abortion restrictions with the goal of testing the undue 
burden standard and the Supreme Court’s protection of abortion rights). 
 99. 550 U.S. 124, 165 (2007). 
 100. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310 (emphasizing that “in Gonzales[,] the 
Court, while pointing out that we must review legislative ‘fact-finding under a 
deferential standard,’ added that we must not ‘place dispositive weight’ on those 
‘findings’” (quoting Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 165)); see also Meghan Harper, Comment, 
Making Sense of Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt:  The Development of a New Approach 
to the Undue Burden Standard, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 757, 777 (2017) (“Instead of giving a 
high deference to the stated legislative rationale behind an abortion regulation, the 
balancing test appropriately replaces this deference with the requirement to examine 
hard evidence and statistics to consider whether a legitimate state interest is necessarily 
reached through a regulation or whether the state interest can be attained without 
harming a woman’s right to abortion in the process.”). 
 101. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309–10 (explaining that the Court 
places “considerable weight upon evidence and argument presented in judicial 
proceedings” when it is tasked with determining the constitutionality of laws regulating 
abortion procedures). 
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First, in its decision, the Court used “evidence-based balancing” of 
the benefits along with the burdens created by the abortion regulations 
and “assesse[d] the impact of . . . abortion restriction[s] in 
constitutional terms sensitive to women’s experience in making and 
carrying out a decision to end a pregnancy.”102  Thus, Whole Woman’s 
Health expanded the scope of Casey, making more room within the 
undue burden standard for consideration of practical barriers to 
accessing the right to abortion.103  Second, the Court questioned, and 
ultimately found insufficient, the state’s asserted women’s health-
protective purpose of the laws.104  The Court noted that, while protecting 
women’s health is a legitimate state interest, the state must advance 
some “evidence that shows that, compared to prior law, . . . the new law 
advance[s] [the state’s] legitimate interest in protecting women’s 
health.”105  As a result, going forward, courts must utilize evidence-based 
balancing in applying the undue burden test to abortion restrictions by:  
(1) examining the record to determine the practical impact the 
restriction has on women’s paths to abortion, and (2) considering 
whether the asserted purpose of the statute is actually supported by a 
demonstrated need for the regulations.106  This requirement strengthens 
the impact of the Casey undue burden standard by making the standard 
more formidable for proponents of statutes that restrict abortion 
access.  Furthermore, the Court only applied this new test to TRAP 
                                               
 102. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 96, at 162; see, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. 
Ct. at 2318 (using evidence of long travel times and distances, as well as overcrowding of 
clinics, to demonstrate the undue burden created by the TRAP laws). 
 103. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300 (“We conclude that neither of these 
provisions confers medical benefits sufficient to justify the burdens upon access that 
each imposes.  Each places a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking a 
previability abortion . . . .”); Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 96, at 162 (“The Court 
considers restrictions cumulatively and in context, describing how, taken as a whole, 
they will alter the lived conditions of exercising the abortion right.”). 
 104. See Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 96, at 158 (“While the majority never 
explicitly states that Texas enacted the admitting privileges and surgical center 
requirements with a purpose to obstruct women’s access to abortion, the Court’s deep 
skepticism of the state’s actual motivation shines through the opinion.”); see also Whole 
Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2315 (comparing Texas’s regulation of abortion with that 
of other medical procedures, which pose greater risk to women’s health, and finding 
the singling out of abortion facilities and providers arbitrary at best and targeted at 
worst); id. at 2320 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“Many medical procedures, including 
childbirth, are far more dangerous to patients [than abortion], yet are not subject to 
ambulatory-surgical-center or hospital admitting-privileges requirements.”). 
 105. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2311. 
 106. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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laws, but did not use limiting language to reach its decision, which 
suggests that courts could apply the test in different contexts in the 
future.107  Since the issuance of the Whole Woman’s Health decision, 
courts have applied the strengthened undue burden standard by 
comparing the practical effects created by a given regulation, and 
engaging in deeper analyses regarding the impact on abortion access 
for the women who are most affected by the regulations.108  Going 
forward, the decision presents wide-ranging implications for many 
types of abortion regulations other than purely medical or health-
related restrictions,109 including those involving minors and judicial 
bypass.110  Specifically, a heightened evidentiary standard for minors 
undergoing the judicial bypass process amounts to an undue burden 
under this strengthened standard set out in Whole Woman’s Health.  This 
makes the imposition of the clear and convincing evidence standard 
unconstitutional and negates the Court’s approval of heightened 
evidentiary standards in the ex parte judicial bypass proceedings in 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health. 
 
 
                                               
 107. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300 (concluding that the provisions at 
issue in the case did not “confer[] medical benefits sufficient to justify the burdens 
upon access” that they created and that they “place[] a substantial obstacle in the path 
of women seeking a previability abortion”). 
 108. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Ark. & E. Okla. v. Jegley, 864 F.3d 953, 959 
(8th Cir. 2017) (applying the Whole Woman’s Health analysis to a regulation involving 
medication abortion facilities by comparing the level of restriction on access to 
facilities created by the regulation to the similar considerations in Whole Woman’s 
Health, and speculating as to the number of women most affected by the regulations 
that would forgo abortions as a result); W. Ala. Women’s Ctr. v. Miller, 299 F. Supp. 3d 
1244, 1254–55 (M.D. Ala. 2017) (engaging in the Whole Woman’s Health requirement 
of demonstrated need for the regulation based on legislative findings by determining 
that, absent legislative findings, a “school-proximity law would impose a substantial 
obstacle . . . [because] the State’s asserted interests are only minimally, if at all, 
furthered by the law, while the burden imposed on a woman’s right to obtain an 
abortion is substantial”); see also id. at 1252 (remarking that “[t]he undue-burden test 
requires courts to examine ‘the [challenged] regulation in its real-world context’”) (quoting 
Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 9 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1287 (M.D. Ala. 2014)). 
 109. See, e.g., Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 96, at 160–61 (arguing that the 
Court’s emphasis on production of legislative findings to justify burdensome abortion 
restrictions could and should also apply to fetal-protective laws). 
 110. See id. at 150. 
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II.   ANALYSIS 
A.   Requiring Clear and Convincing Evidence is an Undue Burden 
Under Whole Woman’s Health 
Use of the clear and convincing evidence standard in judicial bypass 
proceedings constitutes an undue burden under the strengthened test 
set out in Whole Woman’s Health.  This Section will apply the two 
considerations mandated by the Whole Woman’s Health ruling to assert 
that the use of heightened evidentiary standards in judicial bypass 
proceedings are unconstitutional.111  This Section will also argue that, 
in light of this assertion, the unconstitutionality of heightened 
evidentiary standards in judicial bypass proceedings negates the 
Court’s ruling on the issue in Akron Center for Reproductive Health.112  At 
the core of the legal and political debate over restrictions placed on 
minors’ right to abortion is the tension between the legitimate interest 
of the state in protecting parents’ rights to raise their children and to 
be active participants in their children’s decision making,113 and the 
minor’s right to abortion.114  Though fetal protection remains part of 
the state interest in regulation of abortion for both adult women and 
minors, specifically in regulating abortions for minors, there are two 
additional state interests that are commonly espoused to justify the 
imposition of parental involvement laws and, thus, regulations of the 
judicial bypass process.  These justifications or state interests are:  
(1) protecting minors from their own immaturity, and (2) preserving 
parental rights and family cohesion.115  The Whole Woman’s Health undue 
burden framework must be applied to the clear and convincing 
evidence standard in judicial bypass proceedings with respect to both of 
these legitimate state interests.  Thus, this Section will apply the two 
prongs of the Whole Woman’s Health analysis to the imposition of the 
clear and convincing evidence standard in light of the two rationales 
advanced in favor of this standard by:  (1) evaluating to what extent 
the imposition of the clear and convincing evidence standard poses 
                                               
 111. See infra Section II.A. 
 112. See infra Section II.B. 
 113. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 114. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976) 
(holding that a parent cannot possess an absolute veto over a minor’s right to abortion 
because “[a]ny independent interest the parent may have in the termination of the 
minor daughter’s pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of privacy of the 
competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant”). 
 115. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
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practical barriers to minors’ abortion access, and (2) examining each 
rationale for the clear and convincing evidence standard—protecting 
minors from their own immaturity and preserving parental rights—in 
light of the Court’s insistence on a demonstrated need for the abortion 
regulations based on legislative findings. 
1. The clear and convincing evidence standard creates practical barriers to 
  minors’ access to abortion care. 
The Whole Woman’s Health decision requires first that a “practical 
barriers” consideration be applied to the abortion regulation at issue—
that is, whether and to what extent the regulation creates practical 
barriers for minors seeking to access their right to abortion.116  The 
Court in Akron Center for Reproductive Health justified the constitutionality 
of heightened burdens of proof in judicial bypass proceedings 
principally by pointing to the ex parte structure of the proceedings, 
which it considered a significant procedural safeguard.117  However, this 
factor fails to counteract the practical barriers that minors encounter—
created by the heightened clear and convincing evidence standard—
when seeking a judicial waiver that grants access to abortion services.  
Specifically, the heightened standard gives judges more leeway to deny 
petitions for parental consent waivers based on arbitrary determinations, 
such as the minor’s “demeanor,”118 “composure, analytic ability, appearance, 
thoughtfulness, tone of voice, expressions, and her ability to articulate 
her reasoning and conclusions.”119  Furthermore, in states where 
appellate standards of review are highly deferential, decisions based on 
these determinations may go virtually unchecked by appellate courts.120  
                                               
 116. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 117. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 516 (1990). 
 118. In re Doe, 67 So. 3d 268, 268–69 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (“Significantly, the 
trial court made specific findings and expressed particular concern regarding the 
minor’s demeanor.”). 
 119. Ex parte Anonymous, 806 So. 2d 1269, 1274 (Ala. 2001) (listing various factors 
from which a trial judge may “draw inferences”). 
 120. See Sanger, supra note 66, at 420, 433 (noting that, while the judicial bypass 
process is non-adversarial, “[s]ome judges have included moral verdicts within their 
assessment of the minor’s maturity” or “examined petitioners in a prosecutorial 
manner”); Redden, supra note 1 (reporting on the outcomes of forty judicial bypass 
cases from Florida in which “judges denied minors’ petitions for arbitrary, absurd, or 
personal reasons—such as a minor’s failure to discuss her decision with a priest”); see 
also SILVERSTEIN, supra note 41, at 177 (comparing the implementation of Supreme 
Court decisions on judicial bypass to implementation of the ruling in Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and arguing that, while the judicial bypass structure was put 
in place to balance competing interests, in reality judges bring politics into the process). 
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For example, in In re Anonymous 5,121 the Nebraska Supreme Court 
affirmed the trial court’s determination of a lack of sufficient maturity, 
despite the minor having proffered evidence of her fear that her foster 
home placement would be put in jeopardy; her participation in 
multiple sessions of abortion counseling, including multiple 
ultrasounds; her understanding of the potential consequences of 
abortion; and her college plans.122  Additionally, the court in that case 
accorded deference to the trial court’s determination that the sixteen-
year-old minor petitioner was not mature, in part, because she was “not 
self-sufficient, and [was] dependent upon her foster parents.”123  In 
Florida, a court of appeals upheld a denial of a parental consent waiver, 
in which the trial judge had included his own moral convictions as a 
Catholic within the hearing, and actively discouraged the minor from 
seeking the abortion.124  In a more recent case, a Texas court of appeals 
affirmed a trial court’s determination that the minor petitioner was not 
sufficiently aware “of the emotional and psychological aspects of 
undergoing an abortion,” because she testified that she had read a 
booklet produced by the Department of Health detailing the 
psychological consequences of abortion, but could not adequately 
expound on the knowledge she obtained by reading the booklet.125  
Additionally, some courts have denied waiver petitions, despite a 
finding of parental abuse in the minor’s home, potentially making the 
situation for an already vulnerable minor even worse by mandating 
that she carry her pregnancy to term.126 
                                               
 121. 838 N.W.2d 226 (Neb. 2013) (per curiam). 
 122. See id. at 234–35; see also In re Jane Doe 1, 566 N.E.2d 1181, 1184 (Ohio 1991) 
(upholding a trial court determination of lack of maturity, despite a doctor having 
testified to the minor’s sufficient knowledge and understanding of the abortion 
procedure, in addition to allegations of parental abuse and demonstrated college plans). 
 123. Anonymous 5, 838 N.W.2d at 231. 
 124. See In re Doe, 973 So. 2d 548, 554, 564–66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (Kelly, J., 
concurring) (affirming the denial of parental consent waiver, despite the trial judge 
telling the petitioning minor to consider how distressed her Catholic parents would 
be if they discovered that she had obtained an abortion, and referencing his own 
Catholicism in the process). 
 125. See In re Doe, 501 S.W.3d 313, 320–24 (Tex. App. 2016).  Notably, the Texas 
legislature recently adopted the clear and convincing evidence standard in 2015, and 
has a highly deferential “abuse of discretion” appellate standard of review for judicial 
bypass cases.  See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003(i) (West 2016); Placey, supra note 16, at 
739 (listing Texas as requiring an “abuse of discretion” appellate standard of review). 
 126. See, e.g., Redden, supra note 1 (highlighting the statements of an Alabama 
judge who denied a waiver petition, despite the fact that the minor’s father, who 
1934 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1673 
 
Thus, while the heightened evidentiary standard has been advanced 
for the purpose of requiring judges to take more care in deciding these 
cases,127 the practical result is that judges have significantly more room 
to consider potentially arbitrary, insignificant, or inappropriate factors, 
especially where there is a highly deferential appellate standard of 
review in place.128  Moreover, oftentimes the asserted purpose of the 
heightened evidentiary standard with regard to judicial determinations 
seems to indicate that they are actually put in place simply to make the 
process harder for the minor petitioner.129  This makes the ex parte 
structure of the judicial bypass hearing an ineffective safeguard against 
the unduly burdensome nature of the heightened evidentiary 
standard, given that some judges act as a pseudo-adversary in these 
proceedings.  In reality, a minor’s ability to successfully obtain a waiver 
of parental consent through the judicial bypass process may be entirely 
dependent on the judge assigned to her case.130  Additionally, when a 
higher evidentiary standard is coupled with a lack of specific criteria 
accessible to minor petitioners in advance of the hearing, the barrier 
to a minor’s access to abortion is even more difficult to overcome.131  
When combined with the myriad other obstacles within the judicial 
bypass process,132 the heightened clear and convincing evidence 
                                               
physically abused his children, “had told [the minor] that if she ever came home 
pregnant he would kill her”). 
 127. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 517–18 (1990) (finding 
that the clear and convincing evidence standard “does not place an unconstitutional 
burden” on the minor, but rather safeguards due process). 
 128. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (highlighting judges who have 
weighed factors such as the minor’s failure to consult a priest). 
 129. See, e.g., In re B.S., 74 P.3d 285, 289 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that 
application of the clear and convincing evidence standard is permissible “to avoid 
making a judicial bypass a mere pass-through proceeding, and to maximize the court’s 
ability to make a reasoned decision”). 
 130. See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 41, at 170–71 (highlighting the particular difficulty 
with judges in the so-called “Bible Belt” who harbor specific cultural and religious 
inclinations that make them anti-abortion); Redden, supra note 1 (alteration in 
original) (providing commentary from a judicial bypass scholar in which she stated, 
“[I]n practice, girls are at the mercy of whichever judge they happen to draw . . . .  ‘If 
a girl wanders into the wrong [court], she doesn’t have a chance’”). 
 131. See, e.g., supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text; GUTTMACHER INST., supra 
note 10 (noting that only seven states require and publish specific criteria for judges 
to consider in judicial bypass hearings). 
 132. See, e.g., supra note 60; see also Marlow Svatek, Seeing the Forest for the Trees:  Why 
Courts Should Consider Cumulative Effects in the Undue Burden Analysis, 41 N.Y.U. REV. L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 121, 132 (2017) (arguing that an undue burden analysis should 
consider the effects of abortion restrictions in the aggregate); cf. Whole Woman’s 
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standard fails to pass constitutional muster under the first prong in 
Whole Woman’s Health;133 considering the burdens of the standard in 
terms of practical barriers to minors’ abortion access, along with the 
benefits it confers, it constitutes an undue burden on a minor’s right 
to abortion. 
2. There is no evidence based on legislative findings that the asserted purpose 
of imposing the heightened standard matches up with a demonstrated need 
for this measure. 
The second prong of the Whole Woman’s Health undue burden 
framework dictates that the state’s asserted purpose of the abortion 
restrictions must be supported by legislative findings sufficient to show 
a demonstrated need for the regulations.134  However, there is no 
effective evidence showing that there is a need for the clear and 
convincing evidence standard based either on the interest in 
protecting minors from their own immaturity or the interest in 
protecting parental rights.  Therefore, after Whole Woman’s Health, a 
state legislature imposing the clear and convincing evidence standard 
in judicial bypass proceedings must supply findings that support a need 
for this restriction based on the asserted interests. 
In Planned Parenthood of the Great Northwest v. Alaska,135 the Supreme 
Court of Alaska refused to buy into the legislature’s asserted purposes 
for a heightened evidentiary standard in judicial bypass proceedings, 
one of  which was “protecting minors from their own immaturity.”136  
While it is not always phrased in that particular way, this seems to be 
one of the driving forces behind abortion restrictions on minors, 
                                               
Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2313 (2016) (emphasizing the cumulative burdens 
the state’s TRAP laws placed on women seeking to obtain an abortion). 
 133. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309 (“The rule announced in Casey . . . 
requires that courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together 
with the benefits those laws confer.”). 
 134. See id. at 2309–10 (stressing that the Court does not place dispositive weight on 
legislative findings, but rather maintains their constitutional duty to review Congress’ 
findings); id. at 2313 (observing the “virtual absence of any health benefit” produced 
by the Texas law); Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 96, at 157–58 (“[E]xamining the 
evidence about the law’s impact[,] . . . Justice Breyer concludes that the law was at 
cross-purposes with its stated ends . . . This evidence-based balancing of the law’s 
benefits and burdens calls into question Texas’ very purpose in enacting the state’s 
health-justified restrictions on abortion.”). 
 135. 375 P.3d 1122 (Alaska 2016). 
 136. Id. at 1139, 1143 (concluding that the state’s asserted interests were insufficient 
justification for the parental notification statute). 
1936 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1673 
 
originating from the “maturity” standard established in Bellotti.137  
However, there is no sufficient evidence that a heightened evidentiary 
standard would have a protective effect on minors who want to obtain 
an abortion to the extent that it outweighs the burden created by making 
a waiver of parental consent significantly more difficult to obtain.   
For example, because states tend to impose the clear and convincing 
evidence standard based on assumptions that the bypass process is not 
rigorous enough138 or might become a “mere pass-through” proceeding,139 
the ruling in Whole Woman’s Health dictates that the states asserting this 
rationale would need to show that the process was actually functioning as 
a “mere pass-through” without the heightened evidentiary standard in 
place.140  Moreover, the harm of a minor being forced to carry her 
pregnancy to term is much greater than the risk of the minor being 
able to obtain an abortion when it may have been an immature 
decision.141  When comparing the abortion decision in this context to other 
bodily decisions, the distinction becomes clear.  For example: 
[t]he pregnant minor’s options are much different from those facing 
a minor in other situations, such as decision whether to marry.  A 
minor not permitted to marry before the age of majority is required 
simply to postpone her decision . . . .  A pregnant adolescent, however, 
cannot preserve for long the possibility of aborting, which effectively 
expires in a matter of weeks from the onset of pregnancy.142 
                                               
 137. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979); see also Planned Parenthood of Cent. 
Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 102 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (arguing that parental involvement laws help protect minors “from the 
consequences of an incorrect decision”); EHRLICH, supra note 4, at 43 (characterizing 
the dissent in Danforth as viewing “parental involvement as a necessary prerequisite to 
the exercise of the [abortion] right, since a young woman may otherwise mistakenly 
believe that abortion was the best choice for her”). 
 138. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the 
misconception that girls “have it easy” going into bypass hearings has given rise to an 
unfairly heightened standard). 
 139. In re B.S., 74 P.3d 285, 289 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). 
 140. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 132 S. Ct. 2292, 2309–10. 
 141. See Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (“Giving birth to an 
unwanted child involves an irretrievable change in position for a minor . . . .”); see also 
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 475 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring in part, 
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (highlighting the circular 
logic of the “maturity” standard, in that it forces immature minors to carry their 
pregnancies to term and potentially raise a child, despite their judicially determined 
immaturity with regard to their own health decisions); supra note 134 and 
accompanying text. 
 142. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642; see also EHRLICH, supra note 4, at 44 (comparing 
abortion to body piercing, for which “a 16-year-old . . . simply needs to wait two years 
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Thus, the irreversible nature of the harm that occurs if a waiver is 
erroneously denied supports the conclusion that heightening the 
minor petitioner’s burden of proof not only fails to protect her against 
her own immaturity, but actually makes it more likely that she will be 
saddled with an irreversible harm. 
As previously mentioned, the protection of parental rights is the 
second and probably most significant state interest driving states to 
differentiate between the way they regulate abortion access for adult 
women versus minors.143  States enact procedural restrictions on the 
judicial bypass process, including the clear and convincing evidence 
standard, in part to support the role of parents in their children’s 
decision making and encourage family cohesion.144  This is a valid 
purpose, given the invaluable guidance and protection parents can 
provide to their children, and the general presumption that parents 
will act in the their children’s best interest.145  However, there is no 
evidence indicating that a heightened evidentiary standard is necessary 
to serve this legitimate state interest, but rather there is evidence that 
making judicial bypass harder tends to hurt the most vulnerable 
minors, many with already unstable familial relationships.146  Thus, an 
analysis similar to that of the Court in Casey—with regard to spousal 
notification—can be applied here.147 
                                               
until she can self-consent to the procedure,” to demonstrate the comparatively “grave 
and indelible” consequences of not being able to consent to an abortion at the same 
age (quoting Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642)). 
 143. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing parents’ interest in 
directing the upbringing of their children in the abortion context). 
 144. See generally SILVERSTEIN, supra note 41, at 8–10 (asserting that procedural 
restrictions that encourage parental involvement can mitigate the negative psychological 
consequences minors may suffer from obtaining an abortion). 
 145. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69 (2000) (highlighting the “traditional 
presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her child”); 
SILVERSTEIN, supra note 41, at 5–10 (noting that parents can provide support for a 
minor’s physical health and safety, as well as her emotional health and well-being 
during the process of making the abortion decision or obtaining an abortion). 
 146. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2320 (2016) 
(specifying that the “relevant denominator,” or group of women who should be 
considered when a given abortion regulation is challenged, is “those [women] for 
whom [the provision] is an actual rather than an irrelevant restriction” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992))); 
Rex, supra note 57, at 89 (arguing that parental involvement laws, despite judicial 
bypass, create an undue burden on “affected minors,” meaning the minors for whom 
the laws are directly relevant). 
 147. See Rex, supra note 57, at 108–18 (applying the Casey spousal notification 
analysis to parental involvement laws). 
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First, most minors consult their parents before seeking an abortion, 
despite the presence of a judicial bypass option.148  However, thirty 
percent of teens who do not consult their parents refrained from doing 
so because they “feared violence or being forced to leave home,” and 
many others fall through the cracks due to unstable familial 
relationships.149  Indeed, the danger that can come from minors being 
forced to notify or obtain consent from their parents is analogous to 
the points asserted in Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence in Whole Woman’s 
Health; that making the judicial bypass a more formidable barrier—
parental notice or consent, and ultimately childbirth—may actually be 
more harmful to minors than the alternative.150  Furthermore, studies 
show that parental involvement laws disproportionately impact young 
women of minority races for various reasons, including higher rates of 
teen pregnancy, greater likelihood of living in states with parental 
involvement laws, language barriers, and disproportionate low-income 
status.151  Therefore, by making it harder to obtain a waiver of parental 
                                               
 148. ADVOCATES FOR YOUTH, supra note 10. 
 149. Id.; see also EHRLICH, supra note 4, at 114–30 (outlining the various, diverse 
reasons a minor may elect not to consult her parents, including fear of “neglect, 
pressure, and anger,” “anticipated severe adverse parental reaction or parental anger,” 
“concern for the [parent-child] relationship,” “concern for a parent,” “lack of 
relationship,” “parental pressure and ideology,” and “[desire for] autonomy”); Rachel 
Rebouché, Parental Involvement Laws and New Governance, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 175, 
194–95 (2011) (identifying minors in state or foster care as a population particularly 
vulnerable to the defects in judicial bypass proceedings, and asserting that parents’ 
failure to comply with consent requirements might reflect their opposition to abortion 
or “may also relate to a parent’s work schedule, immigration status, or temporary 
absence due to travel or incarceration”); Redden, supra note 1 (“Susan Hays, a Texas 
attorney who represents minors . . . says about a third of the girls she works with don’t 
have the option of asking their parents for permission—they’re undocumented 
immigrants whose parents are not in the country, orphans, or what Hays calls ‘de facto 
orphans’:  ‘Mom’s dead, Dad’s in prison, they never liked me much anyway.’ . . .  Legal 
guardians may grant permission for an abortion in most states.  But this is no help to 
girls who live with family members who never established guardianship.”). 
 150. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2320–21 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) 
(attacking the asserted purpose of the TRAP laws at issue—protecting women’s 
health—by pointing out the greater danger imposed on women if forced to carry a 
pregnancy to term due to practical barriers to abortion access, based on the relatively 
high maternal mortality rate in the United States). 
 151. ADVOCATES FOR YOUTH, supra note 9 (noting that women of minority races face 
higher rates of teen pregnancy and are more likely to live in states with parental 
involvement laws); Issue Brief:  Latinas and Abortion Access, NAT’L LATINA INST. FOR 
REPROD. HEALTH (Jan. 2004), http://latinainstitute.org/sites/default/files/Abortion 
IssueBrief.pdf (highlighting that young Latina women are disproportionately 
impacted by barriers in judicial bypass proceedings for reasons such as lack of 
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consent by imposing a heightened evidentiary standard, the state is not 
serving its interest in supporting familial cohesion for the minors who 
are disparately impacted by the process.152  While the right of parents 
to direct the upbringing of their children maintains an established 
place in privacy jurisprudence,153 there is a point at which this interest 
is outweighed by the minor’s right to abortion.154  The same standard 
that is applied in parental termination hearings, where the parent is 
facing deprivation of the weighty interest of complete parental 
rights,155 should not also be applied in a context where the most the 
parent will be deprived of is the ability to counsel his or her child on 
one health decision—especially one that involves a life-altering, 
constitutionally protected decision for the minor involved. 
The strengthened undue burden standard can be effectively applied 
to the imposition of the clear and convincing evidence standard, even 
though this procedural barrier may not be supported by concrete data 
like the TRAP laws in Whole Woman’s Health.156  Specifically, according 
                                               
awareness “of the existence of [judicial bypass] procedures,” intimidation “due to 
cultural and linguistic barriers,” and Latinas are more likely to be low-income and 
uninsured); Kylie Cheung, As Laws Target Minors’ Abortion Rights, These Groups Help 
Them Get Access, REWIRE (Sept. 13, 2017), https://rewire.news/article/2017/09/13/ 
laws-minors-abortion-groups-help (quoting a representative from the National 
Network of Abortion Funds as saying:  “Young people of color, undocumented youth, 
transgender youth, and others are already too often criminalized because of their very 
identities.  Young people who have been neglected by the systems that are charged 
with supporting them are often hesitant to enter the court system”); U.S. Teenage 
Pregnancies, Births and Abortions, 2008:  National Trends by Age, Race and Ethnicity, 
GUTTMACHER INST. (Feb. 2012), https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/ 
pdfs/pubs/USTPtrends08.pdf (tabulating data “indicat[ing] that there are still large 
and long-standing disparities in [teenage pregnancy, birth, and abortion] rates by race 
and ethnicity”). 
 152. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887–94 (1992) 
(reasoning that spousal notification laws create an undue burden because of the 
potential effect on victims of domestic violence). 
 153. See supra note 47 (highlighting the long-standing precedent respecting a 
parent’s interest in the upbringing of their child). 
 154. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976) (“The 
obvious fact is that when the wife and husband disagree on [the abortion] decision, 
the view of only one of the two marriage partners can prevail.  Inasmuch as it is the 
woman who physically bears the child and who is more directly and immediately 
affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the balance weighs in her favor.”). 
 155. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982) (requiring that allegations 
be proven by clear and convincing evidence to justify termination of parental rights). 
 156. See, e.g., Treadwell, supra note 60, at 878 (applying the undue burden test to 
judicial recusals, even though “[j]udicial recusals are likely not the type of ‘regulation’ 
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to the conclusions in Whole Woman’s Health, state legislatures should be 
required to proffer evidence of the need for procedural restrictions 
like heightened evidentiary standards either to protect minors from 
their own immaturity or to support parental rights and family 
cohesion.157  As there is no evidence of this need, and conversely evidence 
does exist concerning the negative effects of evidentiary standards on 
these interests,158 the imposition of the clear and convincing evidence 
standard creates an undue burden on minors’ right to abortion under 
the new framework in set out in Whole Woman’s Health. 
B.   The Unconstitutionality of the Clear and Convincing Evidence 
Standard in Judicial Bypass Proceedings Negates the Supreme 
Court’s Ruling in Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive 
Health with Respect to the Permissibility of Heightened 
Evidentiary Standards in Judicial Bypass Proceedings 
Having established that requiring minors to prove “maturity” or 
“best interests” by clear and convincing evidence creates an undue 
burden, applying the strengthened undue burden test negates the 
Court’s ruling in Akron Center for Reproductive Health with respect to 
heightened evidentiary standards.  Thus, the procedural due process 
reasoning in the lower court decision should be revisited to inform the 
new undue burden determination.  Given that the clear and convincing 
evidence standard is typically used when a defendant faces potential 
deprivation of a weighty liberty interest, usually in an action initiated 
by the government,159 it simply does not make sense to require a minor 
to meet the same standard to assert a protected liberty interest.160  When 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health was decided, there was no undue 
                                               
the Court had in mind when deciding Casey” because they “have the same effect as laws 
regulating access to abortion”). 
 157. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310 (2016) (“[T]he 
relevant statute here does not set forth any legislative findings.  Rather, one is left to infer 
that the legislature sought to further a constitutionally acceptable objective . . . .”); see 
supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 158. See supra notes 149–150 and accompanying text (highlighting that minors with 
undocumented parents or other strained familial relationships may be forced to carry 
to term because they could not obtain parental permission). 
 159. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (comparing the clear and convincing 
evidence standard used in parental rights termination cases with the one used for civil 
commitment). 
 160. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (arguing that a parent’s interest 
during a parental rights termination case is not comparable to the State’s interest and 
should not be held to the same standard); see also supra note 159. 
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burden standard in place, much less the strengthened undue burden 
standard that now exists under Whole Woman’s Health.  Therefore, the 
Sixth Circuit’s procedural due process analysis, applied pursuant to the 
Mathews framework, would likely no longer be a valid method for 
analyzing this issue.161  However, the basic comparison performed in 
the Sixth Circuit decision with regard to the competing interests at 
stake can help inform the evidence-based balancing test the Court 
would be required to engage in if applying the Whole Woman’s Health 
undue burden standard to the imposition of the clear and convincing 
evidence standard in judicial bypass proceedings.162  In other words, 
while not a permissible controlling test, the Mathews framework can 
help answer the required question introduced in Casey and 
strengthened in Whole Woman’s Health—do the benefits the regulation 
confers outweigh the burdens? 
When engaging in the undue burden analysis, the Court 
“consider[s] the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together 
with the benefits those laws confer.”163  Here, the risk of erroneous 
deprivation of the fundamental liberty interest of obtaining an 
abortion is particularly great given that clear and convincing evidence 
is the highest evidentiary standard used in civil proceedings.164  
Furthermore, the asserted benefits the heightened standard confers—
protecting minors from their own immaturity and preserving parental 
rights—are substantial, but do not outweigh the burdens it imposes on 
a minor’s fundamental liberty interest.165  Specifically, while a lower 
evidentiary standard would present the risk of the minor being able to 
make an “immature” decision, this is outweighed by the risk of 
erroneous deprivation of a constitutionally protected right that is 
implicated by the use of the heightened clear and convincing evidence 
standard.166  Furthermore, while protection of parental involvement in 
                                               
 161. See supra Section I.C. 
 162. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing the Sixth Circuit’s 
consideration of the benefits and burdens of heightened evidentiary standards in 
judicial bypass proceedings as part of its procedural due process analysis); see also supra 
note 96 and accompanying text (noting the Court’s extensive analysis into the purpose 
and effect of an abortion regulation). 
 163. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. 
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887–98 (1992)). 
 164. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 165. See supra Section II.A (rationalizing that the harm of forcing a minor to carry 
a pregnancy to term and raise an unwanted child is greater than the harm imposed by 
a judicial bypass). 
 166. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
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minors’ medical decision making is an asserted benefit of a heightened 
evidentiary standard, parental rights are not absolute where there is a 
weighty interest at issue for the minor.167  Thus, in the judicial bypass 
situation, the minor’s constitutionally protected right to abortion 
should outweigh a parent’s right to have input or control on one 
medical decision for the minor.168 
However, if applying the strengthened undue burden test to 
heightened evidentiary standards, the Court would have to also 
address the heavy reliance on adequate procedural safeguards in Akron 
Center for Reproductive Health.169  At first glance, the ex parte structure 
of the proceeding, as well as the appointment of a guardian ad litem,170 
appear curative of the challenges posed by the clear and convincing 
evidence standard placed on the ultimate bearer of the burden of 
proof—the minor.171  However, it is not this simple.  There are numerous 
defects in these safeguards, including issues with provision of a guardian 
                                               
 167. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 251–52 (1978) (applying the “best 
interests of the child” standard and holding that an illegitimate father who never 
petitioned for legitimation or sought custody of his son did not have the authority to 
block an adoption); see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) (noting that 
the Court has upheld legislation protecting the well-being of children, “even when 
[those] laws have operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected rights”); 
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944) (finding that parents’ rights to 
care, custody, and control over their children are limited and subject to state 
intervention or involvement where the children’s well-being is at stake). 
 168. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (stressing that “it is the woman who 
physically bears the child and who is more directly and immediately affected by the 
pregnancy,” and therefore her interests should outweigh the interests of others). 
 169. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (rejecting the Sixth’s Circuit undue 
burden analysis and implementing an ex parte hearing and assistance with counsel to 
lessen the burden on minors). 
 170. See Graybill, supra note 83, at 585–86 (explaining that a guardian ad litem is 
generally “‘appointed by the court to appear in a lawsuit on behalf of an incompetent 
or minor party’” and is generally “not bound by the client’s expressed wishes and is 
able to advocate for a result that he or she believes to be in the minor’s best interests”). 
 171. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 516 (1990) 
(emphasizing the ex parte structure and appointment of a guardian ad litem as reasons 
for finding the application of the clear and convincing evidence standard in judicial 
bypass proceedings constitutional); see also id. at 515–16 (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 
U.S. 622, 634 (1979)) (providing that state legislatures may place the burden of proof 
in judicial bypass hearings on the petitioning minor). 
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ad litem,172 lack of specific pleading requirements,173 and judges’ 
prosecutorial manner of conducting the ex parte proceeding,174 that 
make them insufficient to overcome the substantial burden produced 
by the heightened evidentiary standard.  More to the point, none of 
these “safeguards” matter if the imposition of the heightened standard 
does not pass the strengthened undue burden test from Whole Woman’s 
Health, which it does not.175 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the new framework established in Whole Woman’s Health, 
the application of the clear and convincing evidence standard to 
judicial bypass proceedings places an undue burden on minors’ right 
to abortion.  This is shown through the examination of the practical 
barriers imposed on minors seeking judicial bypass and by the lack of 
evidence that heightened evidentiary standards serve the state interests 
in protecting minors from their own immaturity or protecting parental 
rights.  To pass constitutional muster, the state legislatures imposing 
this heightened burden would have to proffer findings that show a 
need for this more stringent procedural structure to accomplish one 
of these interests. 
                                               
 172. See Graybill, supra note 83, at 586 (arguing that a guardian ad litem is an 
insufficient representative for a minor in a judicial bypass proceeding due to the 
conflict involved in being a representative of the minor’s wishes versus the minor’s best 
interests, which a guardian ad litem is tasked with protecting).  Additionally, the 
appointment of a guardian ad litem is not required in judicial bypass proceedings, 
meaning that this “safeguard” could simply not exist in states that require a clear and 
convincing evidence standard.  See id. at 585 (noting that states may allow for 
appointment of a guardian ad litem in judicial bypass proceedings); see also Akron Ctr. 
for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 517–18 (upholding the clear and convincing evidence 
standard in the context of a state statute that contained an appointment of guardian 
ad litem provision, but not specifying this as a precondition to the permissibility of 
imposing a heightened evidentiary standard).  But see Ind. Planned Parenthood 
Affiliates Ass’n v. Pearson, 716 F.2d 1127, 1138 (7th Cir. 1983) (requiring appointment 
of counsel for minors going through the judicial bypass process, but only for courts in 
the Seventh Circuit since this decision was not appealed). 
 173. See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 10 (showing that only six out of the fifteen 
states that require clear and convincing evidence in judicial bypass proceedings also 
contain specific pleading requirements in their judicial bypass statutes); see also supra 
notes 64–65 and accompanying text (noting that only a few states provided specific 
criteria for determining “maturity” and “best interests” in judicial bypass proceedings). 
 174. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (highlighting the reoccurrence of judges 
bringing in their own moral convictions and politics into judicial bypass decisions). 
 175. See supra Section II.A (failing to meet the unconstitutional heightened 
evidentiary clear and convincing standard set forth in Whole Woman’s Health). 
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Furthermore, since this heightened evidentiary standard constitutes 
an undue burden, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health is negated with respect to the constitutionality of 
heightened evidentiary standards in judicial bypass hearings.  
Furthermore, procedural safeguards relied on by the Court in this 
decision are insufficient to overcome the unduly burdensome nature 
of heightened evidentiary standards in judicial bypass proceedings. 
Finally, in light of the foregoing conclusions, a model judicial bypass 
statute would contain a preponderance of the evidence standard for 
the minor, as well as specific descriptions of pleading requirements,176 
given the highly subjective nature of the Bellotti factors and the 
demonstrated judicial tendency to consider arbitrary indicators, 
particularly of maturity, but also of best interests.177  These specific 
pleading requirements could include:  consultation with a physician, 
knowledge of the abortion procedure, knowledge of the alternatives to 
abortion, and similarly concrete factors.  Because these requirements 
can sometimes still amount to ambiguous and arbitrary considerations, 
even in the cases of states that have already included specific pleading 
requirements in their judicial bypass statutes.178  The specific pleading 
requirements, coupled with the preponderance of the evidence 
standard, should adequately inform the minor of the requirements of 
the process, and be sufficiently clear to provide a fairer proceeding 
with more certainty in the potential outcome.  Moreover, the inclusion 
of specific descriptions of pleading requirements would aid the minor 
                                               
 176. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.85(A) (West 2013) (outlining the specific 
information that must be included in a judicial bypass complaint).  Another viable 
alternative is placing the decision in a physician’s hands, which would be a more direct 
way of curing the issues with judicial discretion; however, this Comment will not cover 
this alternative extensively, as it does not pertain directly to the issue of evidentiary 
standards in judicial bypass proceedings.  See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-
103(c)(1)(i)–(iii) (West 1991) (providing that a physician may bypass the state’s 
parental notice requirement if she determines:  “(i) Notice to the parent or guardian 
may lead to physical or emotional abuse of the minor; (ii) The minor is mature and 
capable of giving informed consent to an abortion; or (iii) Notification would not be 
in the best interest of the minor”). 
 177. See, e.g., supra notes 118–120 and accompanying text (examining cases in which 
judges denied parental consent waivers for irrelevant reasons, such as the minor’s 
demeanor in court). 
 178. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 390.01114(4)(c) (2011) (requiring factors that necessarily 
require a significant amount of judicial discretion, such as overall intelligence, 
emotional development and stability, credibility and demeanor as a witness, ability to 
accept responsibility, and ability to accept both the immediate and long-term 
consequences of her choices). 
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and any legal representation she is afforded, in the ability to protect her 
fundamental liberty interest, as well as guide the judge presiding over 
the hearing away from arbitrary or inappropriate considerations.179  
Finally, given the weighty liberty interest at stake, and the rampant 
evidence of past trial judges making inappropriate considerations and 
determinations, a model judicial bypass statute would require that 
appellate courts consider judicial bypass issues de novo, so as to 
provide a meaningful check on hearing decisions.180 
                                               
 179. See supra notes 118–120 and accompanying text (demonstrating how the lack of 
pleading guidelines produces inconsistent judicial decisions and varied case outcomes). 
 180. See supra note 16; see also, e.g., Placey, supra note 16, at 732–40 (listing states, 
whose judicial bypass statutes require both a preponderance of the evidence standard 
and a de novo appellate review). 
